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Abstract 
 
Purpose – This paper examines the misvaluation hypothesis using a relative reference point (RRP) 
in M&A market.  
Design/methodology/approach – This paper studies 1,878 deals announced between January 1, 
1985 and December 31, 2014.    
Findings – The paper finds that bidders prefer stock payments when the RRP increases. The RRP is 
positively related to the offer premium and the target announcement returns. Although the RRP is 
negatively related to the bidder announcement returns, it is positively related to the long-run 
performance of bidders who time the market with overvalued stocks. The results are consistent with 
the predictions of the misvaluation hypothesis and reference point theory. 
Originality/value – We construct a dynamic valuation framework to explain the misvaluation 
hypothesis by linking M&As' misvaluation with reference point theory. Our paper provides direct 
evidence that the reference-dependence bias is prevalent for more experienced investors in major 
corporate investment decisions and offers fresh insights into the method of payment hypothesis.     
 
 
 
Keywords Target reference point, bidder reference point, the misvaluation hypothesis, mergers and 
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1. Introduction 
The misvaluation hypothesis explains an important motive of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
The theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) predicts that market misvaluation drives 
M&As. Overvalued bidders who serve the long-run interests of the shareholders will dilute 
overvaluation through stock-financed acquisitions. The misvaluation hypothesis holds that bidders 
are rational whereas the market is irrational. Following Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Dong et al. 
(2006) provided direct evidence that bidders overpay for targets when they are overvalued. Ang and 
Cheng (2006), who investigated the long-run performance of stock bidders, found a positive 
relationship between overvalued stocks and long-run performance. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) provided a behavioural model to explain the reason why targets accept overvalued stocks, 
affirming that fully rational individuals can make mistakes of overestimating synergies, especially 
when market valuation errors are considerable (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). 
   However, conventional misvaluation measures face three major challenges. Firstly, the measures 
relating to firms’ fundamental value, such as price-to-book value (P/B) and price-to-residual income 
value (P/V), cause estimation biases. This is because different accounting approaches across the 
firms would make their fundamental value incomparable. Firms also tend to manipulate accounting 
figures to raise their value especially prior to financial crisis periods. Secondly, existent 
misvaluation measures are mainly based on historical or forward-looking information, according to 
Dong et al. (2006), which are less likely to reflect a firm’s latest status. Thirdly, the frequently used 
MTBV is a problematic proxy, as it represents both mispricing and investment opportunities of the 
firm. According to Di Giuli (2013)
1
, firms with better investment opportunities should also increase 
the propensity of using stocks in acquisitions, leading to the same prediction as the misvaluation 
hypothesis.  
   This paper constructs a new misvaluation proxy, called a relative reference point (RRP).
2
 This 
proxy reflects M&A misvaluation from the perspective of the market’s perception of the firm’s 
valuation, hence eliminating any concerns regarding biases raised from the firm’s fundamental 
value. Following Baker et al. (2012) who measure the target reference point with the deviation of a 
target’s current stock price from its 52-week high price, we define the bidder reference point as the 
                                                             
1
 Di Giuli (2013) proposed some post-merger investment related proxies to disentangle the effects of mispricing and 
investment opportunities.  
2
 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) develop prospect theory that people gauge gains and losses based on a reference point, 
which is rooted in the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Prior research has highlighted the 52-week high as a 
reference price (Huddart et al., 2009, Kliger and Kudryavtsev, 2008, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). 
3 
 
deviation of a bidder’s current stock price from its 52-week high price. The RRP is the difference 
between the target and the bidder reference points, indicating the extent to which the bidder is 
relatively more overvalued than the target (i.e. relatively more overvalued bidders).
3
 The reference 
point effect is salient in M&As as given a short period of time and limited information around the 
M&A announcement date, investors urge to refer to an easier accessible and the most relevant 
information in assessing the firm’s valuation. Therefore, the RRP serves as a clear valuation 
indicator for the M&A deal.  
   Using M&As to investigate the RRP effect is of great interest mainly for two reasons. First, the 
RRP is a direct misvaluation measure that captures the market’s perception of the firm’s valuation, 
since market valuation avoids the controversy of using a firm’s fundamental characteristics (Lin et 
al., 2011). Serving as a major corporate investment activity, M&As draw a great deal of investors’ 
attention. With limited information and time in which to process that information prior to the M&A, 
investors are likely to make decisions based on the most current valuation information, making the 
RRP a suitable valuation proxy. Second, the RRP facilitates M&A process, as bidders can identify 
the sign of relative overvaluation through the RRP. An increase in the RRP would potentially drive a 
relatively more overvalued bidder to dilute overvaluation through acquisitions. Therefore, the RRP 
allows us to observe how major investments are structured.   
   Analyzing a sample of 1,878 U.S. domestic public acquisitions announced between 1985 and 
2014 and using the RRP to test the predictions of the misvaluation hypothesis, we find that the 
propensity to use stocks as a means of payment for acquisitions increases with the RRP, which is 
more pronounced when market-wide valuation is high. Moreover, bidders tend to pay higher offer 
premiums in larger RRP acquisitions. Our results continue to hold after controlling for endogeneity 
that may arise from omitted variable biases. Finally, though the RRP leads to negative bidder 
announcement returns, indicating a role of overpayment, offer premiums according to the RRP are 
translated into less negative abnormal returns for stock bidders in the long-run, suggesting that 
bidders manage to protect the wealth of shareholders with the RRP. Overall, our findings are 
consistent with the predictions of the misvaluation hypothesis and reference point theory.  
   This paper makes four distinct contributions to the literature. Firstly, this paper explains the 
misvaluation hypothesis from the perspective of the reference point effect. We develop a dynamic 
                                                             
3
 We present the construction of the RRP in the methodology section of this paper.  
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valuation framework based on market’s perception of the firm’s valuation. A higher price relative to 
the reference point price is more likely to occur in the higher valuation periods associated with 
larger valuation errors, which increases the probability of the firm being overvalued. The RRP 
allows us to examine how the difference in market valuation between the two firms involved drives 
M&As. We lift the bar to the market level, eliminating any estimation biases arising from the use of 
the firm’s fundamental value.  
   Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to link M&A misvaluation with 
reference point theory. The RRP is likely to shape investors’ minds, for it is easily observable, and 
thus serves as the valuation benchmark for the M&A participants. Baker et al. (2012) found offer 
premiums increase with the target 52-week high, implying that the target reference point alters 
bidders’ perception of the target’s valuation. Targets negotiate for larger offer premiums when their 
current price deviates greatly from their 52-week high price.
 
Similarly, Chira and Madura (2015), 
who focused on the reference point effect on acquisition probability, argued that bidders are 
unwilling to bid for a firm whose price is heavily discounted from its 52-week high price. This 
suggests that targets would frustrate bidders with large offer premiums when targets are perceived 
to be according to the reference point.    
   Thirdly, the paper provides direct evidence that, in the face of the reference-dependence bias, 
the more experienced investors tend to behave similarly to the less experienced investors in major 
corporate investment decisions. However, it is interpreted differently; the market looks at the offer 
premium paid according to the RRP as a result of overpayment, while bidders time the market 
through the RRP. There are less negative long-run abnormal returns for the relatively more 
overvalued stock bidders compared with the relatively less overvalued (or more undervalued) stock 
bidders.    
   Fourthly, the paper offers fresh insights into the method of payment hypothesis. We suggest that 
the sign of relative overvaluation is well indicated by the RRP, relaxing the assumptions of 
irrational targets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) and valuation-error-misled targets (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004) regarding the target’s motive of accepting overvalued stocks,4 since both 
bidders and targets can identify any relative overvaluation. Bidders reduce offer premiums by 
                                                             
4
 Common assumptions on whether the target will accept the overvalued stocks suggest that targets either have a 
cash-out purpose (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) or misled by the market perception (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 
2004). 
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paying stocks than cash for a larger RRP acquisition and paying cash for a lower RRP acquisition 
compared with the case of a higher RRP acquisition.        
   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 designs hypotheses. Sections 3 
summarize the data and present the methodologies. Section 4 analyses the empirical results while 
Section 5 conducts further robustness checks regarding the role of the RRP played in the M&A 
surveyed. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
 The RRP takes the work of Baker et al. (2012) in two directions. Baker et al. (2012) report 
negative bidder announcement returns when offer premiums are paid according to the target 
52-week high, indicating that reference point effect leads to overpayment. On the other hand, they 
argue that bidders who pay according to the target reference point would believe that they could 
outperform the target recent high. Lacking further investigation on the reference point effect on the 
long-run M&A motive, their study fails to address why bidders pay large offer premiums based on 
the target reference point, given that the sign of overpayment is clear. Our paper assesses the 
long-run performance of stock bidders with the RRP, based on the rationale that relatively more 
overvalued bidders tend to use stocks for financing M&As for long-run consideration (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003). If negative market reactions to a bid announcement are the result of managerial 
reference-dependence bias, bidders would perform consistently poorly in the long run, as the market 
will downgrade the firm’s value when it recognizes that M&As are structured by managerial 
perception according to Ma et al. (2016).  
   Furthermore, we add the bidder reference point to interpret M&A valuation. It is evident that 
investigating the target reference point alone does not fully account for the bidder’s M&A motive. 
The market would also look at the bidder reference point, for it is relevant price information readily 
available for the public. Chira and Madura (2015) argue that bidders also assess their value 
according to the bidder reference point. They are unwilling to pay with stocks when the current 
price deviates greatly from the 52-week high price, which is a sign for undervaluation. In addition, a 
small distance between the target current price and the reference point price could offer bidders the 
opportunity for overvaluation dilution only if bidders have even a higher price relative to the bidder 
reference point. On the other hand, a bidder with a high price relative to its reference point price 
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offers the market an intuition that the firm performs well currently, which reinforces its bargaining 
power in an M&A deal. As a result, the firm might tend to pay a lower offer premium otherwise, the 
deal might be perceived as an overpayment. Therefore, the bidder reference points reveal the 
bidder’s M&A motive.  
 If the RRP is a suitable proxy for misvaluation, bidders make decisions according to the RRP 
with the intention to time the market. It is also apparent that all market players can recognise this 
sign of overvaluation through the RRP. Though bidders time the market by paying overvalued 
stocks, they are vulnerable, as rational targets (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004) could accept 
more overvalued stocks as a form of compensation (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014). Hence, using only 
the reference point of the one party is less likely to explain the relative overvaluation. For example, 
the fact that bidder’s current price reached its 52-week high price may still not reflect the case that 
the firm could still be undervalued, especially if the firm has great profit-generating potential that 
could lead to a higher 52-week price in the future. As a result, bidders would avoid paying too much 
in M&As. Moreover, they are more willing to pay with cash instead of stocks if their stocks are 
depressed. Chira and Madura (2015) suggest that optimistic managers who are more likely to 
acquire their firms (i.e. management buyout) than outsider firms would do so, if the stock price is 
low relative to the 52-week high price. The RRP eliminates any of these concerns regarding the true 
valuation of the firm, as the proxy focuses on the relative valuations raised at the market level. We 
expect that managers should focus on the relative misvaluation, which is in line with the view of 
Dong et al. (2006) that misvaluation encourages M&As. The market drives the market valuations of 
the two firms involved away from their fundamental values, providing bidders with greater 
mispricing opportunities when they are relatively more overvalued. 
   The RRP is able to accommodate the market’s intuition of M&A misvaluation. Unlike Dong et 
al. (2006) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004),
5
 we unify the investors’ view to the firm’s 
valuation with the reference point. George and Hwang (2004) found reference-dependent bias 
driving firms’ misvaluation from the stock market. Investors should be reluctant to bid up a stock 
price when it is close to the 52-week high price, as prior good news has driven the firm value 
beyond its fundamental value, leading the market to believe that the firm is overvalued. In contrast, 
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 Dong et al. (2006) proposed the price-to-book value and the price-to-residual income value for bidder misvaluation 
whereas Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) proposed a misvaluation measure based on an assumption that targets 
are rational.  
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investors should be reluctant to sell stocks when their prices deviate greatly from the 52-week high 
price, implying that the firm might be possibly undervalued. We extend these arguments in the 
context of M&As where managers are theoretically highly committed to creating value for the firm 
instead of exploring short-run profits from possible mispricing phenomena. We examine the case of 
possible misvaluation from the perspective of the market based on the change of the market’s 
perception of the firm’s valuation in contrast with Dong et al. (2006), who investigated the firm’s 
overvaluation from the perspective of the managers and measure relative valuations with the 
difference between the firm’s market price and its fundamental value.  
   We suggest that the bidder reference point is as important as the target reference point in 
explaining the M&A motive. Baker et al. (2012) proposed the target reference point to explain how 
much bidders should pay for the target. We suggest that the bidder reference point would lead 
bidders to consider how much they could pay for the target. Poorly performing firms may find it 
difficult to provide any rationale to pay large offer premiums, whilst those with a stock price that is 
close to its 52-week high price are regarded as rich in financing resources and thus will dominate 
the negotiation table. It is also much easier for a well-performed bidder to convince their 
shareholders that the firm is able to manage the deal. Hence, it is likely that bidders will employ 
their reference points to rationalize the M&A motive. On the other hand, a bidder’s price that is 
close to the 52-week high price may risk the firm’s prospects. Barberis and Xiong (2009) suggest 
that investors tend to sell stocks whose price is close to the peak price. Huddart et al. (2009) also 
reported large abnormal sales’ volumes around the 52-week high price. Therefore, though bidders 
have full access to the firm’s fundamental characteristics, they need to justify their decisions 
through the reference points.  
   The RRP also explains the reason why targets tend to accept more overvalued stocks voluntarily. 
The misvaluation hypothesis suggests that bidders are likely to pay with stocks for acquisitions 
when they are overvalued (Dong et al., 2006, Ang and Cheng, 2006). We expect the RRP, which 
reflects market’s perceptions of the firm’s valuation, to provide a more straightforward implication. 
The RRP signals to the target what price they can possibly negotiate with the bidder. If targets 
believe, using the target reference point, that they are overvalued, they would find it even harder to 
justify this market’s perception to overvaluation, as they are generally smaller and lack better 
investment opportunities than the bidders. As a result, targets tend to accept more overvalued stocks 
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for liquidity purposes. If this is true, targets tend to sell their firm for a possibly high price through 
the bidder reference point. In addition, an increase in the RRP also leads target shareholders to 
believe that bidders are attractive, as it is more likely for the bidder to rebound to a higher reference 
point price than the target (Chira and Madura, 2015). Hence, they might believe that selling the firm 
to a well-run bidder would be more likely to generate wealth.
6
  
The misvaluation hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) indicates that bidders use stocks 
when they are overvalued. Such a sign of overvaluation is revealed by the firm’s reference point, as 
the market has a tendency to assess the firm’s valuation by its reference point (Baker et al., 2012). 
Managers will also consider eliminating these overvaluation concerns through the reference point. 
The RRP reflects the extent to which the bidder is relatively more overvalued, which facilitates the 
method of payment. Bidders tend to pay with stocks for targets when the RRP reveals that bidders 
more overvalued in relative terms, since holding overvalued stocks in the market will hurt the value 
of the firm in the future. Therefore, the probability of using stocks for payment purposes increases 
in line with movements in the RRP, leading to our first testable hypothesis of: 
H1: There is a positive correlation between the RRP and the likelihood of using stocks as a means 
of payment in M&As. 
 
   Dong et al. (2006) suggest that bidders will use both stocks and cash to dilute overvaluation, as 
it remains a priority objective for bidder managers. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that bidders’ 
overvaluation is diluted through acquiring a less overvalued firm. We measure relative bidder-target 
valuations with the RRP. Consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis, we expect that bidders would 
increase offer premiums when they are relatively more overvalued (than the target firms) as 
reflected in the RRP. In addition, offer premiums are likely to be raised when targets can identify 
any sign of misvaluation with the RRP. Based on the above argument we hypothesize that: 
H2: M&A offer premiums are positively correlated with the RRP. 
 
 Bidders with a high price relative to 52-week high should have stronger bargaining position, 
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 In the light of this, Burch et al. (2012) found targets tend to reserve bidders’ overvalued stocks, believing that 
highly-valued bidders are also well-performed or have better investment opportunities.  
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leading shareholders to expect a low offer premium paid to the target, whereas a high offer premium 
leads the market to believe that there is an overpayment, incurring negative market reactions to the 
bid announcement. On the other hand, we argue that the target firm as shareholders would expect 
that targets with a relatively higher reference point would have a higher probability of profiting 
through acquisitions. Therefore, our third testable hypothesis is: 
H3: Bidder (Target) short-run performance is negatively (positively) correlated with the RRP. 
 
   Finally, an increase in the RRP suggests that bidders are relatively more overvalued, leading 
bidders to use stocks to alleviate the risk of overvaluation, whereas cash payment may introduce 
further overvaluation if targets are already overvalued. If this is the case, M&As serve as a 
value-enhancing opportunity for those exploring relative valuation with overvalued stocks. 
Therefore, we limit our sample to stock bidders, leading to our last testable hypothesis of:  
H4: There is a positive correlation between stock bidder’s long-run performance and the RRP 
indicator.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
The initial sample covers 36,506 U.S. domestic public acquisitions announced between January 1, 
1985, and December 31, 2014, as provided by Thomson One. Stock price is collected from CRSP, 
and a series of standard accounting variables are collected from COMPUSTAT. We require those 
accounting variables to be available for the fiscal year end prior to the announcement date. Public 
acquisitions refer to the two firms involved being publicly traded U.S. firms (listed on 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ).
7
 Once we excluded deals that were classified as recapitalizations, 
repurchases, self-tender offers and rumors according to Thomson One, we are left with 11,615 
observations. We require that the offer premium is not a missing value, which further reduces the 
number of observations to 5,450. We require the stock price for the calculation of the bidder and the 
target 3-day CARs to be available, which reduces our sample to 4,630 observations. We also require 
the payment method information to be available in Thomson One, leaving us with 4,290 
observations. The final sample of our study comprises of 1,878 observations after excluding all 
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 We required firms with available stock price to calculate the firm’s reference point price.  
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bidders and targets with missing values on the selected variables (2,134 and 278 firms 
respectively).
8
 
 We first studied the RRP effect on the probability of using stocks as a means of payment for 
acquisitions. Bidders’ size is expected to be negatively related to the stock-financed acquisition. 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) suggest that larger bidders have higher credit facilities, which reduces 
the probability of using stocks to pay for acquisitions. We measure the firm’s growth opportunities 
with MTBV. Higher MTBV bidders tend to use more stocks in acquisitions, in that they reserve 
cash to fund new investment projects (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005, Dong et al., 2006). We measure 
firm profitability with the return-on-asset ratio (ROA). We suggest that firms with higher 
profitability are more likely to use retained earnings held in cash rather than stocks as it reduces 
costs of financing. We also account for the target characteristics, since stocks are more likely to be 
used to mitigate the target risk (Hansen, 1987). In this respect, the propensity to use stocks is greater 
when targets’ risk increases, such as targets are large, with high MTBV and low ROA.    
 Following Officer (2004), we measure information asymmetry with the standard deviation of 
the firm’s stock returns. Hansen (1987) suggests that stocks are more likely to be used when level of 
information uncertainty increases. Leverage is defined as debt-to-equity ratio (D/E). Vermaelen and 
Xu (2014) suggest that over-levered bidders who justify stock financing in terms of moving to an 
optimal capital structure lead to an increase of overvalued stocks accepted by targets, whereas 
highly leveraged targets should be reluctant to receive overvalued stocks. We proxy liquidity using 
the cash flow-to-equity ratio (CF/E). Higher liquidity firms are more likely to be less financially 
constrained firms, which result in the method of payment for acquisitions is cash rather than stocks. 
Inclusions of capital structure related variables in the regressions should allow us to disentangle the 
effects of firm’s capital structure decision and misvaluation on stock-financed acquisitions.    
  In a further analysis, we study the RRP effect on the offer premium. Different categories of 
variables were controlled in line with the work of Eckbo (2009). Specifically, we measure firm size 
with a logarithm of market valuation (MV). According to the hubris management hypothesis (Roll, 
1986), larger bidders tend to pay generously for smaller targets. We measure the firm’s profitability 
with ROA. Agency theory suggests that poor-performing bidders tend to dissipate firms’ resources, 
and thus overpay for the target, whereas well-performing firms are attractive to bidders (Schwert, 
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 We excluded all the missing variables that are not used in the regressions and reported the summary of the acquisition 
sample and variables. 
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2000). We measure firm growth opportunities with MTBV. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest the 
extrapolation hypothesis that glamour bidders are less cautionary than value bidders about the target 
valuation, leading to higher offer premiums. Harford (1999) suggests that the target MTBV links 
with the managerial takeover motive since bidders are more aggressive in exploring synergies from 
the lower MTBV target. Stock volatility is proxied using the standard deviation of returns over 335 
calendar days ending 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date. Following Schwert (1996), 
we also take the firm’s run-up price into consideration when examining offer premiums. All 
regressions include year and industry effects to overcome the outlier effect. 
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports a summary of the acquisition sample. The mean (median) value of the deal in our 
sample is $1,540.29 million ($227.49 million).
9
 Of 1,878 acquisitions, 608 all stock-financed 
acquisitions, 726 all cash-financed acquisitions and 539 mixed acquisitions.
10
 We have 702 
diversifying acquisitions, 1,597 successful acquisitions
11
 and a small proportion of tender offers 
and hostile acquisitions, 380 and 134 respectively.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Table 2 reports summary statistics for variables. Panel A presents the dependent variables used 
in OLS regressions, including offer premiums, the bidder and the target 3-day CARs (CAR3) 
calculated using the market model. The mean offer premiums is 31%. Panel B presents the main 
variables of interests. The mean bidder reference point in our sample is lower than the target 
reference point, 29.4% to 41.2%, showing that bidders on average are relatively more overvalued in 
M&As according to the RRP. The mean value for the RRP is 11.8%. Panel C presents all control 
variables. Bidders are generally larger, have better performance and better investment opportunities 
than their targets, measured with the firm’s MV, ROA and MTBV respectively. These findings are 
consistent with prior M&A literature (Fuller et al., 2002, Moeller et al., 2004). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3.3 Methodology 
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Our sample includes only public acquisitions whose transaction value is large each year on average according to the 
summary of sample in Table 1, which alleviates our concerns that small deals may bias our results.  
10The method of payment information for five acquisitions is defined as “Others” in Thomson One. 
11
Our research retains both successful and failed M&A deals, as reasons for deal failure are complex and not easily 
observable. The reference point effect mainly explains the bid initiation rather than whether the deal is finally acquired, 
as in the note of Baker et al. (2012). In that case, we include all M&A deals to make our findings widely applicable.   
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3.3.1 The relative reference point (RRP) and offer premiums 
The 52-week high price is a highly relevant piece of price information that shapes investors’ minds 
to the firm’s prospects. The market would naturally borrow it as a reference point (RP). According 
to George and Hwang (2004), the 52-week high price is an outcome of a series of good news that 
occurred in the past driving the firm’s market value beyond its fundamental value. This proxy is 
associated with market’s perception of the firm’s valuation. A high price relative to the 52-week 
high price would therefore indicate that the firm is still in the momentum of the “good news”, 
leading the firm to be more overvalued. In contrast, a low price relative to the 52-week high price 
indicates that the good news effect is less relevant or the firm experiences bad news, leading the 
firms to be less overvalued or more undervalued. A firm with a high price relative to its 52-week 
high price will acquire a firm with a lower relative price. Therefore, a target reference point (TRP) 
that is larger to the bidder reference point (BRP) is a sign that the bidder is relatively more 
overvalued. The extent to which the bidder is more overvalued than the target is measured with the 
relative reference point (RRP). Our data also show that TRP is on average larger than BRP.
12
 
Formulas for RP, RRP and offer premiums are as follows: 
 
, 30 , 30log(52 ) log( )i i t i tRP WeekHigh StockPrice    
                         (1)    
 
i i iRRP TRP BRP   
                         (2) 
               
   , , , 30log logi t i t i tOfferPremiums OfferPrice TStockPrice    
                         (3) 
 
where RPi denotes the reference point of each firm i. The bidder (target) reference point is defined 
as the logarithmic term difference between the bidder’s (target’s) highest stock price over 335 
calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and bidder’s (target’s) stock price 30 
calendar days prior to the announcement date.
13
 RRP denotes the relative reference point defined as 
the target reference point (TRP) and the bidder reference point (BRP). Offer premiums are 
calculated as the logarithmic term difference between the offer price (OfferPrice) and target stock 
price 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date (TStockPricei,t-30).  
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 We used the difference between the target reference point and the bidder reference in an attempt to obtain a positive 
value, making our results easier to interpret. 
13
 This mitigates the effect of information leakage on the stock price.   
13 
 
3.3.2 Classification of high-, neutral- and low-valuation markets 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggest that stock-financed acquisitions are positively 
related to market-wide valuation. Following Bouwman et al. (2009), we classify market valuation 
periods using the price-earnings (P/E) ratio of the market index (S&P 500) and monthly data.
 
First, 
we de-trend the market P/E ratio by removing the best straight-line fit (OLS) from the P/E of the 
month in question and the five preceding years. Secondly, each calendar month is classified into 
high- (low-) market valuation groups if the de-trended market P/E ratio of that month is above 
(below) the five-year average. Then, we rank the months according to the de-trended market P/E 
ratio. Months in the top 25% of the above average group are classified as high-market valuation 
months, months in the bottom 25% of the below average group are classified as low-market 
valuation months, the remaining months being classified as neutral-market valuation months. Thus, 
half of the months are classified as neutral-market valuation and the other half contains months of 
both high- and low-market valuation. The idea of de-trending market valuation is to remove the 
upwards trend because the most recent acquisitions generally have a higher market valuation than 
the past due to market inflation and other effects. 
 
3.3.3 Short-run method 
Following Eckbo et al. (2016), we calculate firms’ announcement returns using the market model 
        , 1 , ,i t m t i tR R              (4) 
where Ri,t denotes holding period returns (CRSP: RET) for firm i in the period t, Rm,t denotes 
value-weighted market returns including dividends (CRSP: VWRETD), ,i t  denotes the error term. 
We estimate the market model parameters over the window from 261 to 28 trading days prior to the 
announcement date [-261, -28], and used a 3-day event window [-1, 1].   
 
3.3.4 Long-run method 
Following Loughran and Vijh (1997), we calculate firm’s long-run performance with 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). This captures investors’ long-run 
holding experience. We calculate 36-month BHARs with the following equation: 
, , ,
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
T T
i t i t index t
t t
BHAR R R
 
    
      (5) 
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where Ri,t is the arithmetic returns for firm i on day and Rindex,t is the arithmetic return for the market 
index on day t.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 The RRP effect on the probability of using stocks 
Table 3 reports a positive relationship between the RRP and the likelihood of using stocks. 
Specification (4) shows that stocks are 1.04% more likely to be used when the RRP increases 10% 
(t = 3.453). The inclusions of information asymmetry, and capital structure related variables of the 
two firms involved do not change the sign and significance level of the RRP. Bidders are more 
likely to use stocks when information asymmetry is high. It is also suggested that stocks are likely 
to be used when the firm’s leverage is high, suggesting that bidders are cautious about using debt 
for investments when they have large financial risks.  
[Insert Table 3 here]  
   Results are consistent with the those of Eckbo et al. (2016) finding small firms are likely to use 
stocks. Our main results suggest that the relatively more overvalued bidders are likely to use stocks 
on M&A transaction,
14
 which are consistent with what Shleifer and Vishny’s misvaluation 
hypothesis (2003) predicts regarding the target’s motive of accepting overvalued stocks. Bidders 
whose price is close to their 52-week high price would give targets a chance of selling out 
overvalued shares for profits. Our results show that targets tend to accept stocks of bidders with 
high MTBV (t = 3.846), which is consistent with the view of Burch et al. (2012). Our results also 
suggest that bidders time the market with the RRP. When the market news has driven the target 
firm’s current value away from its fundamental value, bidders have an incentive to exploit such 
mispricing with overvalued stocks, believing that it provides greater potential for overvaluation 
dilution.15 
[Insert Table 4 here]  
   Table 4 reports the RRP effect on the probability of using stocks under different market 
conditions. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) indicate that the overestimation of synergies 
                                                             
14
 Our results are robust when replacing the RRP with a ratio of the target reference point over the bidder reference 
point to, indicating the extent to which the target is less overvalued relative to the bidder.  
15
 It can be argued that when the target current price is significantly lower than its 52-week high, the target may 
experience risks of bankruptcy. In that case, we believe that bidders would be cautious about these targets and may not 
focus on their 52-week high. Our study focuses on the whole sample.       
15 
 
increases with market valuation errors. Consistent with this view, we find that the RRP effect is 
more pronounced when valuation errors are large. Table 4 shows that for every 10% increase in the 
RRP would lead to an increase of using stocks about 1.53% when the market-wide valuation is high 
and 1.09% when the market-wide valuation is neutral. The RRP effect on market condition is 
insignificant in the low market-wide valuation periods when mispricing opportunities are low.   
 
4.2 The RRP effect on the offer premium 
Thus far, we have examined the reference point effect on stock-financed acquisitions, suggesting 
that managers time the market with overvalued stocks revealed by the RRP. It remains interesting to 
explore the reference point effect on bidders’ pricing decision. Baker et al. (2012) found that M&A 
pricing decisions are based on the target 52-week high price. We examine the M&A motive of the 
two firms involved by studying the RRP effect on offer premiums.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 The first four specifications of Table 5 used different categories of control variables.
16
 The sign 
and significance level of the RRP do not change significantly compared with that reported in 
specification (5). It reports that the RRP is positive and significant at the 1% level (coefficient 0.109, 
t = 4.726), showing that a 10% increase in the RRP is associated with a 1.09% increase in offer 
premiums. The signs and significance levels of our control variables are consistent with prior M&A 
studies (Moeller et al., 2004, Alexandridis et al., 2013). Our results suggest that the relatively more 
overvalued bidders overpay for the target according to the RRP, which are consistent with the 
reference point theory of M&A. It can be interpreted as follows: bidders perceived as overvalued 
will pay a price according to the target reference point to obtain the deal and thus diluting 
overvaluation (Baker et al., 2012). Moreover, when bidders’ price is close to the 52-week high price, 
they will suffer significant losses in the long run either because of initial overvaluation to be 
corrected (Jensen, 2005) or their stocks to be aggressively sold around the peak price (Barberis and 
Xiong, 2009). Hence, through timing the market with the RRP, bidders would pay heavily for a less 
overvalued target to revise the market’s perception. On the other hand, targets would also demand 
high offer premiums, as a high price relative to the bidder reference point leads targets to believe 
that the bidder is able to pay higher offer premiums. Our study, by extending the sample period of 
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 We produce a correlation matrix for our independent variables. These results are presented in Appendix A showing 
little evidence of econometric problems, such as multicollinearity issues.  
16 
 
Dong et al. (2006), provides up-to-date evidence that M&A offer premiums increase with market 
valuation errors, as reported in Appendix B.
17
 Our results obtained in this table suggest that high 
offer premiums area form of compensation for the targets’ willingness of accepting overvalued 
stocks. Therefore, the RRP rationalises bidder’s M&A offer premiums.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
   However, we are aware of the fact that not all acquisitions in our sample involve a relatively 
more overvalued bidder measured with the RRP. In addition, bidders may have difficulty in paying 
high offer premiums if they were undervalued. Thus, we partitioned our sample into two 
subsamples, the relatively more overvalued bidders (i.e. RRP>0) and the relatively more 
undervalued bidders (i.e. RRP<0). In line with Dong et al. (2006), overvaluation motivates the firm 
to engage in M&As, we therefore expect that firms of these two subsamples perform significantly 
different.  
   We conducted univariate analyses regarding to the offer premium, bidder and target 
announcement returns, as reported in Table 6. Our results show a majority of deals are RRP driven, 
1,155 as opposed to 723, which is consistent with the findings of Fu et al. (2013) while contradicts 
the view of Savor and Lu (2009). Panel A of this table reports that acquisitions are carried with 
significantly larger offer premiums when bidders are relatively more overvalued than the opposite 
case, the mean difference for the offer premium is 5% and at the 1% significance level. Our results 
suggest that overvalued bidders are likely to pay with high offer premiums for the undervalued or 
less overvalued targets, suggesting that managerial primary M&A motive is to dilute overvaluation. 
Due to this, bidders believe targets may not accept the deal until high offer premiums are paid. Our 
findings corroborate those of Baker et al. (2012) by showing a positive relationship between the 
offer premium and the target reference point
18
. In Panel B, both subsamples show significantly 
negative bidder announcement returns. The relatively more overvalued bidders perform 
significantly worse than the relatively more undervalued bidders, with a negative mean difference 
of 0.8% and at the 5% significance level. These results are also consistent with those of Ma et al. 
                                                             
17
 Our sample period covers the high valuation trends when investors’ misperception is high, such as the stock market 
bubble between 2000 and 2002, and the housing bubble and credit crisis between 2007 and 2009. Our results show that 
the misvaluation hypothesis is more likely to explain acquisitions after 1990 than before 1990 when the primary M&A 
motive is synergies. The misvaluation tends to be larger after than before 2008 financial crisis. Once again, our results 
show that the relative overvaluation drives M&A’s overpayment. 
18
 Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between offer premiums and the target reference point in the relatively more 
overvalued bidder subsample (i.e. RRP>0), as offer premiums paid to these M&As are mainly driven by the relative 
more overvalued bidders. Our trend is similar to that in the work of Baker et al. (2012).     
17 
 
(2016) who found that bidders with a lower price relative to their 52-week high price outperform 
those with a higher price relative to the reference point price. Panel C reports target announcement 
returns by the RRP. Both relatively more overvalued bidders and more undervalued targets receive 
stronger market reactions than the other group. In particular, the mean difference for target 
announcement returns is 4.9% (t = 4.33), suggesting that targets involved in high RRP acquisitions 
can demand high offer premiums based on the RRP, which is translated into higher announcement 
returns.  
   Panel D reports univariate analysis results for the offer premium by the method of payment in 
the two RRP subgroups. Our results are consistent with the prediction of the misvaluation 
hypothesis that overvalued stocks are used as cheap currency. Specifically, all cash-financed 
acquisitions carry higher offer premiums when bidders are relatively more overvalued than 
relatively more undervalued bidders. As the result shows a mean difference of 8.5%, which is at 1% 
significance level. Moreover, the mean difference of cash and stock payments for acquisitions in the 
case that bidders are relatively more overvalued is 3.92%, suggesting that all stock-financed 
acquisitions carry lower offer premiums than all cash-financed acquisitions when bidders are 
relatively more overvalued. Combined, relatively more overvalued bidders tend to avoid using cash, 
as it will increase the offer premium. Our results note the reason of overvalued bidders using stocks 
for acquisitions in terms of takeover costs, indicating that the RRP indicates managerial method of 
payment choices. 
 
4.3 Whether relatively more overvalued bidders benefit in the short run? 
Since the RRP reflects the market’s perception of the firm’s valuation, we directly assessed the 
market’s reactions to the relatively more overvalued bidders, as reported in Table 7. If all market 
players can recognise, through the RRP, the sign of relative overvaluation, negative market 
reactions to a bid announcement should increase with the RRP. Using the target 52-week high as an 
instrument variable of offer premiums in the regression of bidder announcement returns on offer 
premiums, Baker et al. (2012) found that the target reference point price leads to overpayment. The 
reason of doing this is because that the target reference point price is uncorrelated with bidder 
management. We duplicated the test of Baker et al. (2012) using our dataset with a similar 
expectation that increased offer premiums, based on the target reference point, would lead to higher 
18 
 
negative market reaction for bidders as those firms may find hard to justify this overpayment in the 
short run. Our findings, reported in Appendix C,
19
 are similar to those of Baker et al. (2012) 
providing further evidence on the reliability of our study.       
[Insert Table 7 here] 
   Our results show that bidders (targets) receive more negative (positive) market reactions by the 
RRP. Specifically, the mean difference for a bidder CARs in a higher RRP acquisition and a lower 
RRP acquisition is negative (1.38%) and significant at the 1% level, as reported in Panel A. Targets’ 
announcement returns are positive and increase with the RRP, as reported in Panel B.
20
 Our results 
are in line with the reference point theory of M&As. The market would presumably believe that the 
chance of price rebounding tends to increase when the bidder’s current stock price is close to its 
52-week high price. However, engaging in takeovers makes it hard to realise the wealth of 
shareholders in the short run. The market reacts negatively to the bid announcement, as it believes 
that bidders are unable to deliver real support to the firm’s performance and that they are likely to 
undertake bad acquisitions to maintain such overvaluation (Jensen, 2005).   
 
4.4 Do stock bidders protect the wealth of long-run shareholders?  
We now turn to investigate whether bidders focusing on the RRP protect the interest of their 
long-run shareholders. According to the misvaluation hypothesis, bidders dilute overvaluation with 
stocks in an attempt to protect the wealth of long-run shareholders. We suggest that bidders making 
an offer price based on the RRP would follow a similar rationale. In Table 8, we limit our sample to 
acquisitions that are 100% financed by stocks only and rank the sample into four quartiles 
according to the RRP, each presenting 152 observations, as reported in Panel A.
21
 We examine 
whether overpayment leads underperformance. By doing so, we estimate the relationship between 
the offer premium and long-run performance under market-adjusted model for each correspondent 
quartile. The fourth quartile (i.e. the highest RRP rank) includes acquisitions involving relatively 
more overvalued bidders whereas the first quartile (i.e. the lowest RRP rank) includes acquisitions 
                                                             
19
 We do not follow the approach of Baker et al. (2012) by using our main proxy RRP as an instrumental variable for 
offer premiums, since it contains both the bidder and target valuations that are correlated with bidder announcement 
returns. Doing so will introduce estimation bias in our results. Our results show that the target 52-week 
high-driven-offer premiums lead to more negative bidder announcement returns.  
20
 Our results are also robust when CARs were estimated using a 5-day window and the market-adjusted model is 
employed.  
21
 Of the 608 all stock-financed acquisitions, 402 fall into the group in which bidders are relatively more overvalued.  
19 
 
involving relatively less overvalued or more undervalued bidders.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
   Results of Panel A suggest that stock-financed acquisitions generate negative long-run returns, 
which are consistent with the M&A literature (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998, Loughran and Vijh, 1997). 
Bidders in the highest quartile pay the highest offer premiums as compared with those of other 
quartiles. In spite of this, the mean difference of offer premiums between the groups of the relative 
more overvalued bidders and undervalued bidders is 9.9% (significant at the 1% level) and the 
mean difference for long-run abnormal returns of stock bidders is 18.7% (significant at the 10% 
level). This indicates that relatively more overvalued bidders, though overpaying for acquisitions, 
they tend to outperform their undervalued counterparts. Similarly, we estimate the long-run 
performance of bidders with the size-adjusted model reported in Panel B. The results are consistent 
with those under the market-adjusted model.     
   Our results suggest that stock bidders paying high offer premiums according to the RRP are able 
to protect the wealth of long-run shareholders, evidence consistent with Ang and Cheng (2006) who 
found long-run performance of stock bidders and overvaluation been positively related. However, 
we contradict the findings of Lin et al. (2011) who conducted similar tests as ours for the long-run 
performance of the overvalued bidders. Their paper classifies bidder valuation by the ratio of 
price-to-fundamental value (P/V) with higher P/V indicating a more overvalued bidder, indicating 
that bidders who have the highest P/V generate a significant negative market performance for both 
short and long runs within three years after M&As as compared with those bidders in the other P/V 
quartiles.   
   
5. Robustness checks 
5.1 Endogeneity issues 
OLS can be subject to endogeneity issues arising from omitted variable biases in this paper, as the 
RRP maybe correlated with firms’ mismanagement or mispricing which cannot be observed or the 
possibility that the market perception is likely the be an accurate reflection of the firm’s valuation. 
If the market could accurately estimate the value of the firm, the managers should have no chance 
of timing the market through the RRP. However, this tends to be unrealistic as the misvaluation 
hypothesis proposes. In this case, we suggest that the market’s 52-week high and the bidder’s and 
20 
 
target’s recency ratio to be used as instrumental variables given that they are not correlated with 
offer premiums but correlated with the RRP. The market’s 52-week high is an ideal instrumental 
variable as it is uncorrelated with the firm’s mismanagement. Baker et al. (2012) also indicate that 
market-wide valuation should be highly correlated with the reference point prices. We also suggest 
that the bidder’s and the target’s recency ratios can be used as instrument variables due to investors’ 
attention bias. Following Bhootra and Hur (2013), a firm reaches to its 52-week high price in the 
recent past is more salient to the investors’ minds, leading the firm’s price to be more overreacted. 
Thus, high recency ratio indicates that firms are overvalued. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
   According to our results presented in Table 9, the OLS is preferred over the 2SLS.
22
 This is 
because the market 52-week high reflects the market-wide valuation instead of the firm-specific 
valuation which is believed to be an important source of valuation error (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). 
We also believe that longer investment horizons should be less relevant to firms’ valuation than 
shorter ones, as recent events would potentially have a bigger impact on investors’ decision-making 
process compared to the more distant events (Bhootra and Hur, 2013). Overall, the OLS is likely to 
dominate the 2SLS.  
 
5.2 The effect of the RRP on the probability of using stocks 
A series of robustness checks regarding the RRP effect on the probability of using stocks are 
conducted and reported in Appendix D. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) predict that bidders use stocks 
when they are relatively more overvalued. We divided our M&A sample into two subgroups: the 
relatively more overvalued bidders (i.e. RRP>0), and the relatively more undervalued bidders (i.e. 
RRP<0), as presented in Panel A.
23
 Our results suggest that the RRP effect on the probability of 
using stocks is solely driven by the relatively more overvalued bidders. Panel B reports the 
probability of using stocks rather than other means of payment is also large when the RRP increases. 
Panel C reports the results of stocks as a percentage of method of payment on the RRP. Our results 
continue to hold by replacing the binary variable with a continuous variable.  
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 Specifically, the Hausman test shows a p-value of 0.5252, indicating there is no endogeneity issues in the regression.   
23
 There are 1,742 observations in regressions. 1,103 fall into the group of relatively more overvalued bidders and 639 
fall into the opposite. 50 observations are dropped due to multicollinearity problems of the year and industry dummies. 
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5.3 The effect of the RRP on the offer premium 
We report the RRP effect on offer premiums across different subsamples in Appendix E. We divide 
our samples into subsamples according to the method of payment, deal type, deal choice and deal 
status. Our control variables are as the same as those presented in the specification (5) of Table 5. 
Specifications (1) and (2) report a positive relationship between the RRP and offer premiums by 
different method of payment subsamples. The offer premium is larger when paying with cash than 
stocks, which is consistent with our univariate analysis results of Panel D of Table 6. The RRP 
effect remains strong for both successful and unsuccessful M&A deals, suggesting that the RRP 
serves as a valuation benchmark for deal initiation. This result contradicts the suggestion of Chira 
and Madura (2015) that the two firms involved with a higher price relative to their reference points 
are likely to complete the deal, while those with a lower price relative to their reference points are 
less willing to complete the deal, in that the firms see large disadvantages in the negotiation 
position.
24
 Therefore, it is evident that the RRP effect on offer premiums is strong regardless of 
different subsamples by deal characteristics.  
   Our study also provides evidence that the RRP can be utilised as a piece of information relating 
to the firm’s valuation when the target’s information asymmetry level is high, making difficult for 
the bidder to estimate the true valuation of the target firm. We partition our sample by the median 
value of target’s information asymmetry and our results are reported in Panel B. The RRP effect on 
offer premiums appears to be stronger for the higher target information asymmetry subsample 
compared with the lower subsample. Our results are in line with the view of Burghof and 
Prothmann (2011), finding a positive relationship between firm’s reference point prices and the 
level of information uncertainty.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the misvaluation hypothesis using the reference point theory of M&As. We 
develop a bilateral valuation framework with the RRP and our results that are consistent with the 
misvaluation hypothesis. 
 We put the targets’ and the bidders’ reference points into the M&A platform, affirming that the 
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 They examine the reference point effect on the probability of deal completion. The significance level of the reference 
point is significantly weakened after different controls included in the logistic regression model.  
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propensity to pay for acquisitions with stocks is greater when the RRP increases. This trend appears 
to be more pronounced when the market misperception of the firm’s valuation is high. Moreover, 
the offer premium increases with the RRP, leading to more negative bidder (positive target) 
announcement returns, indicating that the RRP plays a role in overpayment, which is in line with 
the misvaluation hypothesis. Using a quartile analysis for a sample of all stock-financed 
acquisitions, we find that the relatively more overvalued bidders receive less negative long-run 
abnormal returns by the RRP suggesting that bidders time the market through the RRP. Our results 
show that the RRP can be a reliable indicator for firm’s valuation.   
 This study contributes to the behavioral finance and M&A literature in many ways. We provide 
a simply way of structuring M&A through the RRP which reflects the most current market reactions 
to the firm’s valuations. The valuation measure is a benchmark for the firm’s valuation at the market 
level. The market tends to react to bidders’ announcements negatively due to a high offer premium 
paid according to the RRP. This is different from the reason of bidders looking at the reference 
points. Our findings reveal that higher offer premiums according to the RRP would reduce negative 
market reactions in the long run, suggesting that focusing on the RRP is also a bidder’s thinking 
weighed for the value of the firm. Therefore, bidders are rational by employing the RRP for M&A 
pricing decision. We also find that managers who have more information about the firm than the 
outsiders are also subject to the reference point effect. Overall, our results suggest that managers 
use the RRP to time the market and formulate M&A strategies, consistent with the misvaluation 
hypothesis. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for acquisition sample 
This table reports summary statistics for 1,878 U.S. domestic public deals announced between 1985 and 2014. The 
number N denotes the number of deals per year. The third and fourth columns present the mean and median of deal 
value. The fifth to seventh columns present the method of payment. Here “Stock” refers to all-stock acquisitions. “Cash” 
refers to all-cash acquisitions. “Mix” refers to acquisitions that are neither all stock-financed nor all cash-financed 
acquisitions. “Completed” refers to completed deals (i.e. successful deals), and there are 1,874 with information relating 
to deal status. “Tender” refers to tender offers. “Hostile” refers to hostile bids. “Diversification” refers to diversified 
deals in which the primary two Standard Industry Classification codes are different between bidders and targets.  
Year N 
Deal Value 
($mils) 
Payment Method Completed Tender Hostile Diversification 
    Mean Median Cash Stock Mix Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
1985 5 243.86  53.00  3 1 1 3 2 - 5 1 4 2 3 
1986 21 129.04  41.70  18 1 2 18 3 7 14 1 20 15 6 
1987 34 254.60  47.25  18 6 8 30 3 6 28 5 29 17 17 
1988 30 381.53  68.92  15 8 7 24 6 11 19 6 24 16 14 
1989 24 114.04  30.49  11 10 3 17 6 4 20 1 23 18 6 
1990 23 579.03  29.38  12 7 4 18 5 5 18 3 20 10 13 
1991 23 172.38  26.82  7 14 1 19 3 3 20 - 23 14 9 
1992 21 155.46  51.44  6 13 2 17 4 1 20 2 19 12 9 
1993 45 519.07  114.00  14 18 12 33 12 7 38 5 40 20 25 
1994 61 222.95  74.12  23 30 8 46 14 9 52 7 54 18 43 
1995 98 538.98  74.91  27 53 18 84 14 14 84 6 92 38 60 
1996 95 684.53  138.25  31 40 24 80 15 18 77 9 86 36 59 
1997 130 645.10  232.11  19 62 49 113 17 19 111 3 127 46 84 
1998 138 1208.89  140.12  36 54 47 126 12 27 111 3 135 47 91 
1999 164 1513.65  305.42  61 58 45 134 30 41 123 14 150 68 96 
2000 136 2286.88  378.34  35 68 33 119 17 32 104 8 128 49 87 
2001 109 1115.01  146.89  33 40 36 94 15 27 82 4 105 38 71 
2002 49 1784.72  268.90  20 14 15 44 5 16 33 4 45 18 31 
2003 71 807.01  130.82  27 18 26 65 6 19 52 5 66 19 52 
2004 66 2859.54  479.02  25 16 25 60 6 6 60 3 63 22 44 
2005 66 2874.25  500.75  29 13 24 60 6 7 59 5 61 24 42 
2006 75 1838.00  563.07  40 12 23 65 10 6 69 4 71 29 46 
2007 60 1478.29  792.51  39 6 15 53 7 12 48 2 58 18 42 
2008 57 2208.95  234.26  35 6 16 40 17 14 43 10 47 17 40 
2009 44 3498.35  496.88  17 8 19 41 3 16 28 - 44 18 26 
2010 56 1884.97  572.72  33 9 14 47 9 16 40 5 51 15 41 
2011 41 2691.37  611.62  16 8 17 28 13 8 33 9 32 13 28 
2012 38 1385.71  622.51  26 1 11 37 1 10 28 - 38 17 21 
2013 44 1997.05  1139.09  28 5 11 39 5 9 35 3 41 12 32 
2014 54 6908.66  1662.39  22 9 23 43 11 10 44 6 48 16 38 
Total 1878 1540.29  227.49  726 608 539 1597 277 380 1498 134 1744 702 1176 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for variables 
This table reports the number, mean, median and standard deviation of variables. Firms’ 3-day CARs were calculated 
using the market model, with parameters estimated between 261 and 28 trading days prior to the announcement date. 
Offer premiums are the logarithmic term difference between offer price and target stock price 30 calendar days prior to 
the announcement date. Reference point is the logarithmic term difference between a firm’s highest price over 335 
calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and the price on 30 days prior to the announcement date. 
The RRP is the difference between the target and the bidder reference points. “Relative Size” is defined as the deal 
value divided by bidder MV, where bidder MV is defined as the product of market price and outstanding shares (CRSP: 
SHROUT*PRC). ROA is return-on-asset ratio, defined as net income (Compustat: NI) divided by total asset 
(Compustat:AT). MTBV is market-to-book value, defined as the market value of equity to the book value of equity, 
where book value of equity is total shareholders’ equity (Compustat: SEQ) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
(Compustat: TXDITC) minus the preferred stock redemption value (Compustat: PSTKRV). Volatility is the standard 
deviation of daily returns over the 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date. CF/E is cash 
flow-to-equity ratio, defined as income before extraordinary items (Compustat: IBC) plus depreciation and amortization 
(Compustat: DPC) minus cash dividends (Compustat: DV), and leverage is measured by debt-to-equity ratio, defined as 
total long-term debt (Compustat: DITT) divided by the book value of equity. Run-ups are the pre-bid run-up prices 
calculated in the time-window of [-365, -7]. All accounting variables were in the fiscal year end before the 
announcement date, and continuous variables were winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Main Dependent Variables 
Offer Premiums 1878 0.310  0.292  0.282  
Bidder 3-day CARs 1878 -0.011  -0.007  0.073  
Target 3-day CARs 1878 0.222  0.176  0.240  
Panel B: Main Variables of Interest 
Bidder Reference Point 1878 0.294  0.157  0.351  
Target Reference Point 1878 0.412  0.255  0.455  
RRP 1878 0.118  0.055  0.420  
Panel C: Other Variables: deal, bidder, and target characteristics 
Cash 1878 0.387  - 0.487  
Stock 1878 0.324  - 0.468  
Hostile 1878 0.071  - 0.257  
Tender 1878 0.202  - 0.402  
Diversification 1878 0.374  - 0.484  
Relative Size 1878 0.401  0.191  0.555  
Bidder lnMV 1878 7.500  7.443  2.159  
Bidder MTBV 1878 3.991  2.632  6.269  
Bidder ROA 1878 0.026  0.047  0.138  
Bidder Volatility 1878 0.029  0.025  0.017  
Bidder RunUps 1878 0.156 0.100 0.457 
Bidder Leverage 1872 0.661  0.330  1.194  
Bidder CF/E 1804 0.161  0.180  0.316  
Target lnMV 1878 5.212  5.133  1.839  
Target MTBV 1878 2.691  1.797  4.300  
Target ROA 1878 -0.049  0.024  0.241  
Target Volatility 1878 0.041  0.035  0.022  
Target RunUps 1878 0.107 0.051 0.573 
Target Leverage 1870 0.619  0.140  1.621  
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Table 3. The effect of the RRP on the probability of using stocks 
This table reports binomial logistic regression for all-stock acquisitions on the RRP. Dependent variable is “Stock”, which is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if acquisitions 
are 100% financed with stocks, 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 2. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels was denoted ***, ** and * respectively and reported alongside marginal effects. We transferred coefficients into marginal effect (ME), evaluated at the sample 
means of the independent variables. All year and industry effects were included in the regressions.  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Stock Coef. t-stat. ME   Coef. t-stat. ME   Coef. t-stat. ME   Coef. t-stat. ME 
RRP 0.567*** (3.739) 0.103  
 
0.605*** (3.793) 0.110  
 
0.531*** (3.376) 0.097  
 
0.570*** (3.453) 0.104  
Hostile -0.777** (-2.469) -0.141  
 
-0.742** (-2.345) -0.135  
 
-0.721** (-2.296) -0.132  
 
-0.670** (-2.137) -0.123  
Tender -2.441*** (-9.766) -0.443  
 
-2.402*** (-9.529) -0.436  
 
-2.563*** (-9.485) -0.468  
 
-2.502*** (-9.200) -0.458  
Diversification 0.146 (1.113) 0.027  
 
0.124 (0.936) 0.023  
 
0.146 (1.081) 0.027  
 
0.120 (0.881) 0.022  
RelativeSize -0.611*** (-4.042) -0.111  
 
-0.662*** (-4.296) -0.120  
 
-0.561*** (-3.576) -0.102  
 
-0.606*** (-3.767) -0.111  
Bidder lnMV -0.379*** (-6.845) -0.069  
 
-0.290*** (-4.886) -0.053  
 
-0.402*** (-7.193) -0.073  
 
-0.314*** (-5.215) -0.057  
Bidder MTBV 0.048*** (4.326) 0.009  
 
0.036*** (3.337) 0.007  
 
0.060*** (4.710) 0.011  
 
0.048*** (3.846) 0.009  
Bidder ROA -2.063*** (-4.033) -0.375  
 
-0.914* (-1.704) -0.166  
 
-2.464*** (-4.017) -0.450  
 
-1.407** (-2.174) -0.257  
Target lnMV 0.315*** (4.845) 0.057  
 
0.350*** (5.042) 0.063  
 
0.348*** (5.221) 0.064  
 
0.375*** (5.187) 0.069  
Target MTBV 0.051*** (3.417) 0.009  
 
0.041*** (2.758) 0.008  
 
0.063*** (3.857) 0.012  
 
0.055*** (3.302) 0.010  
Target ROA 0.087 (0.303) 0.016  
 
0.371 (1.199) 0.067  
 
0.009 (0.029) 0.002  
 
0.218 (0.687) 0.040  
Target Volatility 
    
5.118 (1.144) 0.928  
     
3.773 (0.800) 0.690  
Bidder Volatility 
    
32.029*** (4.903) 5.809  
     
30.994*** (4.517) 5.670  
Bidder Leverage 
        
-0.232*** (-3.367) -0.042  
 
-0.211*** (-3.167) -0.039  
Target Leverage 
        
-0.126*** (-3.016) -0.023  
 
-0.121*** (-2.793) -0.022  
Bidder CF/E 
        
0.213 (0.836) 0.039  
 
0.233 (0.868) 0.043  
Year  Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
  
Industry Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
  
Constant 0.324 (0.558) 
  
-1.480** (-2.146) 
  
0.592 (0.915) 
  
-1.130 (-1.508) 
 
N 1878 
   
1878 
   
1792 
   
1792           
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.272       0.287       0.291       0.303            
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Table 4. Testing the effect of the RRP on the probability of using stocks under different market-wide valuations 
This table reports binomial logistic regression for all-stock acquisitions on the RRP by different market conditions. 
Dependent variable is “Stock”, which is a dummy variable, taking value of 1 if acquisitions are financed with 100% 
stocks, 0 otherwise. High Market is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if takeover months in the top 25% above past 
5-year average de-trended P/E of the market index (S&P 500) or market valuation is high, 0 otherwise. Specifications 
(1)-(3) report the results for high, low and neutral valuation periods, respectively. We were able to determine 1733 
observations with valid market-wide valuation data, 666 for high valuation periods, 434 for low valuation periods, and 
633 for neutral valuation periods. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 2. Robust t-statistics were reported in 
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels was denoted ***, ** and * respectively and reported 
alongside marginal effects. We transferred coefficients into marginal effect (ME), evaluated at the sample means of the 
independent variables. All year and industry effects were included in the regressions.  
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Stock High 
 
Low 
 
Neutral 
  Coef. t-stat. ME   Coef. t-stat. ME   Coef. t-stat. ME 
RRP 0.758*** (3.049) 0.153 
 
1.021 (1.583) 0.059 
 
0.510* (1.902) 0.109 
Hostile -0.317 (-0.735) -0.064 
 
-1.043 (-1.284) -0.060 
 
-0.723 (-0.969) -0.155 
Tender -2.339*** (-6.194) -0.473 
 
-1.195** (-2.037) -0.069 
 
-4.251*** (-5.319) -0.910 
Diversification 0.797*** (3.383) 0.161 
 
-0.165 (-0.418) -0.010 
 
-0.060 (-0.263) -0.013 
RelativeSize -0.968*** (-4.184) -0.196 
 
-0.847 (-1.550) -0.049 
 
-0.307 (-1.180) -0.066 
Bidder lnMV -0.377*** (-4.014) -0.076 
 
-0.809*** (-3.746) -0.047 
 
-0.141 (-1.398) -0.030 
Bidder MTBV 0.052*** (3.078) 0.011 
 
0.060 (1.337) 0.003 
 
0.038 (1.601) 0.008 
Bidder ROA -2.376*** (-2.602) -0.481 
 
-1.664 (-0.751) -0.096 
 
-2.797* (-1.804) -0.599 
Target lnMV 0.600*** (5.282) 0.121 
 
0.696** (2.453) 0.040 
 
0.170 (1.401) 0.036 
Target MTBV 0.062** (2.416) 0.013 
 
-0.004 (-0.081) 0.000 
 
0.063** (1.968) 0.014 
Target ROA -0.154 (-0.300) -0.031 
 
0.069 (0.078) 0.004 
 
0.699 (1.230) 0.150 
Target Volatility 8.929 (1.141) 1.808 
 
-1.335 (-0.061) -0.077 
 
-1.354 (-0.169) -0.290 
Bidder Volatility 15.449 (1.459) 3.127 
 
35.750 (1.477) 2.068 
 
51.081*** (4.021) 10.936 
Bidder Leverage -0.306*** (-3.064) -0.062 
 
-0.219 (-1.029) -0.013 
 
-0.169 (-1.440) -0.036 
Target Leverage -0.129* (-1.697) -0.026 
 
-0.089 (-0.934) -0.005 
 
-0.203** (-2.477) -0.043 
Bidder CF/E 0.096 (0.265) 0.019 
 
-0.634 (-0.918) -0.037 
 
2.044*** (3.192) 0.438 
Year  Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
  Industry Yes 
   
Yes 
   
Yes 
  Constant -2.916** (-2.137) 
  
-0.057 (-0.032) 
  
0.044 (0.030) 
 N 666 
   
434 
   
633           
 Pseudo R
2
 0.345       0.268       0.333     
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Table 5. The effect of the RRP on the offer premium 
This table reports the OLS regression results for offer premiums on the RRP. Specification (1) reports the relationship between offer premiums and the reference point effect, 
specification (2) controlled for deal characteristics, specification (3) controlled for deal and bidder characteristics, specification (4) controlled for deal and target characteristics, 
specification (5) controlled for all variables. All year and industry effects were also included in the regressions. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 2. Robustness 
t-statistics were reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels was denoted ***, **and * respectively and reported alongside coefficients.  
 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Offer Premiums Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.101*** (5.099) 
 
0.105*** (5.311) 
 
0.106*** (5.290) 
 
0.134*** (6.199) 
 
0.109*** (4.726) 
Hostile 
   
0.008 (0.367) 
 
0.000 (0.018) 
 
0.019 (0.898) 
 
0.033 (1.620) 
Tender 
   
0.075*** (4.744) 
 
0.075*** (4.728) 
 
0.083*** (5.284) 
 
0.078*** (5.166) 
Diversification 
   
0.006 (0.433) 
 
0.004 (0.311) 
 
0.007 (0.488) 
 
-0.015 (-1.110) 
Stock 
   
-0.024 (-1.336) 
 
-0.019 (-1.034) 
 
-0.021 (-1.131) 
 
-0.002 (-0.100) 
Cash 
   
-0.009 (-0.565) 
 
-0.001 (-0.071) 
 
-0.020 (-1.194) 
 
-0.029* (-1.808) 
RelativeSize 
      
0.020 (1.515) 
 
0.023* (1.950) 
 
0.114*** (7.151) 
Bidder ROA 
      
0.084 (1.182) 
    
0.019 (0.271) 
Bidder MTBV 
      
-0.001 (-0.665) 
    
-0.000 (-0.353) 
Bidder lnMV 
      
0.005 (1.163) 
    
0.054*** (9.321) 
Bidder Volatility 
      
0.219 (0.297) 
    
0.808 (1.007) 
Bidder RunUps       0.036** (1.964)     0.018 (0.866) 
Target ROA 
         
0.099** (2.366) 
 
0.124*** (2.949) 
Target MTBV 
         
-0.003* (-1.953) 
 
-0.003* (-1.727) 
Target lnMV 
         
-0.033*** (-7.113) 
 
-0.078*** (-11.766) 
Target Volatility 
         
-0.806 (-1.425) 
 
-0.835 (-1.338) 
Target RunUps          0.063*** (4.079)  0.040** (2.247) 
Constant 0.212*** (3.291) 
 
0.182*** (2.744) 
 
0.133* (1.779) 
 
0.357*** (4.741) 
 
0.180** (2.280) 
Year  Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Industry Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
N 1878 
  
1878 
  
1878 
  
1878 
  
1878           
adj. R
2
 0.077     0.088     0.091     0.127     0.174           
30 
 
Table 6. Univariate analysis by different RRP groups 
This table reports univariate analysis results for the offer premium, the bidder and the target’s cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR3) in a 3-day window around the announcement date by the RRP. CAR3 were calculated with market 
model. We divided our sample into those RRP less than 0 (i.e. RRP<0 group), which represents the bidder is relatively 
more undervalued than the target and those RRP larger than 0 (i.e. RRP>0 group), which represents the bidder is 
relatively more overvalued than the target. Panel A reports the univariate analysis results for the offer premium. Panel B 
reports the univariate analysis results for the bidder CAR3. Panel C reports the univariate analysis results for the target 
CAR3. Panel D reports univariate analysis for the offer premium by the method of payment. Here “Cash” represents 
that acquisitions are 100% financed with cash. “Stock” represents acquisitions that are 100% financed by stocks. 
Specifications (1) and (2) of Panel D report offer premiums of 100% cash-financed acquisitions at RRP>0 and RRP<0 
groups. Specifications (3) and (4) of Panel D report offer premiums of 100% stock-financed acquisitions at RRP>0 and 
RRP<0 groups. The mean value, t-statistics, and the number of observations for the offer premium, the bidder and the 
target 3-day abnormal returns around the announcement date were reported in each Panel. The mean difference of t-tests 
is reported at the end of each Panel. T-statistics were reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels was denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
Panel A: Univariate analysis for the offer premium 
 
Offer Premiums t-stat. N 
(1) RRP<0 0.279*** (30.20) 723 
(2) RRP>0 0.329*** (37.26) 1,155 
Mean difference (2)-(1)  0.050***  (-3.79)   
Panel B: Univariate analysis for the bidder CAR3 
 
Bidder CAR3mm t-stat. N 
(1) RRP<0 -0.006** (-2.27) 723 
(2) RRP>0 -0.014*** (-6.37) 1,155 
Mean difference (2)-(1)  -0.008** (-2.28)   
Panel C: Univariate analysis for the target CAR3 
 
Target CAR3mm t-stat. N 
(1) RRP<0 0.191*** (23.81) 723 
(2) RRP>0 0.240*** (32.34) 1,155 
Mean difference (2)-(1)  0.049*** (4.33)   
Panel D: Univariate analysis for the offer premium by the method of payment in different RRP subgroups 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   Mean difference 
 
RRP>0 RRP<0   RRP>0 RRP<0 
 
(1)-(2) (3)-(4)   (1)-(3) (2)-(4) 
 
Cash 
 
Stock 
      
Offer Premiums (%) 35.25*** 26.75*** 
 
31.33*** 29.22*** 
 
8.50*** 2.11 
 
3.92* -2.47 
t-stat (25.18) (20.90) 
 
(19.07) (14.51) 
 
(4.24) (0.80) 
 
(1.88) (-1.08) 
N 435 291   402 206   724 608   837 497 
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Table 7. Whether relatively more overvalued bidders benefit in the short run? 
This table reports univariate analysis results for the bidder and the target’s 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR3) 
by RRP quartiles, as reported in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. The firm’s CAR3 were calculated with the market 
model. The parameters were estimated in the window [-261,-28]. The mean value, t-statistics, and the number of 
observations for bidder CAR3 and target CAR3 are reported in each Panel. The mean difference of t-tests is reported at 
the end of each Panel. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 2. T-statistics were reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels was denoted ***, **and * respectively. 
Panel A: Bidder 3-day CARs by RRP quartiles 
  Bidder CAR3 t-stat. N 
1 (RRP<0) -0.0069** (-2.04) 470 
2 -0.0091*** (-3.05) 469 
3 -0.0066* (-1.96) 470 
4 (RRP>0) -0.0207*** (-5.58) 469 
Mean difference 4-1 -0.0138*** (-2.77)   
Panel B: Target 3-day CARs by RRP quartiles 
  Target CAR3 t-stat. N 
1 (RRP<0) 0.2016*** (19.26) 470 
2 0.1736*** (19.92) 469 
3 0.2265*** (22.09) 470 
4 (RRP>0) 0.2846*** (20.73) 469 
Mean difference 4-1 0.0830*** (4.81)   
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Table 8. Do stock bidders protect the wealth of long-run shareholders? 
Panel A of this table reports the univariate analysis results of both the offer premium and the firms’ 36-month 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR36ma) by RRP quartiles. The sample used in this analysis only 
consists of 100% stock-financed acquisitions. Each quartile was assigned a rank from 1 to 4. Rank 1 represents bidders 
that are relatively more undervalued than their targets (i.e. RRP<0), and rank 4 represents bidders that are relatively 
more overvalued than their targets (i.e. RRP>0). Panel B of this table serves as a robustness check of the results of 
Panel A. It reports the univariate analysis results of both the offer premium and the firms’ 36-month size-adjusted 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR36sa) by the RRP. We divided the RRP into three levels, the bottom one third or 
rank 1 refers to bidders are relatively more undervalued, while the top one third or rank 3 refers to bidders are relatively 
more overvalued, the middle rank accounts for the remaining observations. We report mean value, t-statistics and the 
number of the offer premium at each rank. BHAR36ma and BHAR36sa are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. We 
performed the bootstrap estimation of sampling distribution of BHAR36ma and BHAR36sa at 1000 replications, and 
report mean value, p-value and the number of BHAR36ma and BHAR36sa of each rank. The mean difference of t-tests 
was reported at the end of the table. T-statistics (or p-value for long-run BHARs) were reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels was denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
Panel A: Market-adjusted 36-month BHARs by RRP quartiles 
All stock-financed acquisitions Offer Premiums t-stat. N BHAR36ma p-value N 
1 (RRP<0) 0.296*** (12.12) 152 -0.348*** (0.000) 137 
2 0.251*** (11.74) 152 -0.221** (0.017) 144 
3 0.283*** (12.02) 152 -0.198** (0.025) 145 
4 (RRP>0) 0.395*** (13.86) 152 -0.161* (0.093) 147 
Mean difference 4-1  0.099*** (2.63) 
 
0.187* (0.079) 
 
Panel B: Size-adjusted 36-month BHARs by RRP (Robustness check) 
All stock-financed acquisitions Offer Premiums t-stat. N BHAR36sa p-value N 
1 0.294*** (14.53) 201 -0.400*** (0.003) 158 
2 0.262*** (13.04) 201 -0.206** (0.040) 180 
3 (RRP>0) 0.360*** (15.29) 206 -0.253*** (0.001) 174 
Mean difference 3-1  0.066** (2.11)   0.147* (0.073)   
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Table 9. Endogeneity issues 
This table reports the RRP effect on the offer premium by controlling for endogeneity issues. Results from an OLS 
regression and a 2SLS regression are presented in this table. The RRP was treated as an endogenous variable. The 
market 52 week high and the bidder and the target rencecy ratio were treated as instrumental variables. We first 
obtained the fitted value from the regression of the RRP on the instrument variables and then replaced the RRP with the 
fitted value. Results were reported in the “IV” Column. The market 52-week high is defined as the logarithmic term 
difference between the highest total market value (CRSP: TOTVAL) over the 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to 
the announcement date and the total market value 30 days prior to the announcement date, similar to the definition of 
the target and bidder reference points. The bidder (the target) recency ratio is defined as 1 subtracts the number of days 
between the date of the firm’s 52-week high price and the takeover announcement date divided by 365 days, larger the 
value suggests the firm’s 52-week high price occurs more recently. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 2. 
Robustness t-statistics were reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels was denoted 
***, ** and * respectively and reported alongside coefficients. The results of the Hausman test, first-stage test and the 
Sargan score were reported in the lower part of the table.   
Offer Premiums OLS   IV 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.109*** (4.726) 
 
0.046 (0.444) 
Hostile 0.033 (1.620) 
 
0.032 (1.279) 
Tender 0.078*** (5.166) 
 
0.077*** (4.621) 
Diversification -0.015 (-1.110) 
 
-0.016 (-1.215) 
Stock -0.002 (-0.100) 
 
0.000 (0.010) 
Cash -0.029* (-1.808) 
 
-0.030* (-1.786) 
RelativeSize 0.114*** (7.151) 
 
0.116*** (7.501) 
Bidder ROA 0.019 (0.271) 
 
0.008 (0.150) 
Bidder MTBV -0.000 (-0.353) 
 
-0.001 (-0.502) 
Bidder lnMV 0.054*** (9.321) 
 
0.054*** (9.895) 
Bidder Volatility 0.808 (1.007) 
 
0.115 (0.088) 
Bidder RunUps 0.018 (0.866)  0.039 (1.038) 
Target ROA 0.124*** (2.949) 
 
0.117*** (3.582) 
Target MTBV -0.003* (-1.727) 
 
-0.003* (-1.648) 
Target lnMV -0.078*** (-11.766) 
 
-0.078*** (-12.484) 
Target Volatility -0.835 (-1.338) 
 
-0.138 (-0.113) 
Target RunUps 0.040** (2.247)  0.013 (0.278) 
N 1878 
  
1878 
 
adj. R
2
 0.174     0.174   
Hausman test 0. 4038 (p=0.5252) 
   
F-stat. 22.0734 (p=0.0000)    
Over-identifying restrictions 
(Sargan score) 
43.3021 (p=0.0000)       
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Appendix A. Variables correlation matrix 
This table reports pairwise Pearson correlation of the variables used in the regression of offer premiums on the RRP. All variables definitions are as in the note of Table 2.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. RRP 1.000                                 
2. Hostile -0.045 1.000 
               3. Tender -0.020 0.133 1.000
              4. Diversification -0.007 -0.018 0.025 1.000
             5. Stock 0.096 -0.112 -0.292 -0.029 1.000
            6. Cash -0.036 0.052 0.332 0.114 -0.549 1.000
           7. RelativeSize -0.094 0.208 -0.071 -0.118 0.010 -0.272 1.000
          8. Bidder ROA -0.090 0.010 0.088 0.097 -0.188 0.173 -0.119 1.000
         9. Bidder MTBV 0.009 -0.066 -0.046 -0.010 0.151 -0.077 -0.079 0.145 1.000
        10. Bidder lnMV -0.047 -0.050 0.094 0.076 -0.184 0.181 -0.376 0.313 0.204 1.000
       11. Bidder Volatility 0.067 -0.035 -0.069 -0.068 0.333 -0.257 0.145 -0.484 0.111 -0.418 1.000
      12. Bidder RunUps 0.113 -0.016 -0.073 -0.026 0.188 -0.165 -0.008 -0.067 0.302 0.058 0.304 1.000
     13. Target ROA -0.279 0.062 0.009 0.029 -0.065 0.011 0.100 0.300 -0.004 0.091 -0.287 0.017 1.000
    14. Target MTBV -0.128 -0.037 -0.019 0.009 0.125 -0.071 -0.052 0.038 0.184 0.159 0.066 0.169 0.043 1.000
   15. Target lnMV -0.209 0.109 -0.005 -0.084 -0.096 -0.076 0.187 0.176 0.115 0.621 -0.317 0.053 0.305 0.191 1.000
  16. Target Volatility 0.308 -0.109 -0.007 0.038 0.232 -0.076 -0.152 -0.270 0.093 -0.237 0.629 0.169 -0.470 0.039 -0.511 1.000
 17. Target RunUps -0.371 -0.048 -0.013 0.002 0.009 0.007 -0.054 0.044 0.117 0.122 0.073 0.375 0.067 0.303 0.057 0.203 1.000
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Appendix B. Testing the effect of the RRP on the offer premium over time 
This table reports the OLS regression results for offer premiums on the RRP over time. Specifications (1)-(3) report results before 1990, 1990 to 2000, and after 2000 respectively. 
Specifications (4) and (5) divided the whole sample after 2000 into two periods before and after the 2008. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 2. Robustness t-statistics 
were reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels was denoted ***, **and * respectively and reported alongside coefficients.  
 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Offer Premiums 1985-1989   1990-2000   2001-2014   2001-2007   2008-2014 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP -0.080 (-0.973) 
 
0.091*** (3.134) 
 
0.146*** (3.568) 
 
0.105** (2.128) 
 
0.213*** (3.211) 
Hostile -0.051 (-0.547) 
 
0.057* (1.939) 
 
0.032 (1.091) 
 
0.089** (2.264) 
 
-0.003 (-0.067) 
Tender 0.179*** (2.816) 
 
0.119*** (5.000) 
 
0.048** (2.173) 
 
0.017 (0.544) 
 
0.079** (2.475) 
Diversification -0.041 (-0.833) 
 
-0.001 (-0.033) 
 
-0.023 (-1.200) 
 
-0.045* (-1.770) 
 
0.010 (0.331) 
Stock 0.089 (1.145) 
 
-0.002 (-0.094) 
 
-0.037 (-1.309) 
 
-0.005 (-0.139) 
 
-0.078* (-1.798) 
Cash 0.026 (0.379) 
 
-0.087*** (-3.335) 
 
0.006 (0.275) 
 
0.023 (0.766) 
 
0.006 (0.195) 
RelativeSize 0.085** (2.164) 
 
0.131*** (5.740) 
 
0.091*** (3.314) 
 
0.069* (1.878) 
 
0.121*** (2.919) 
Bidder ROA 0.584** (2.254) 
 
-0.004 (-0.039) 
 
-0.003 (-0.029) 
 
-0.080 (-0.658) 
 
0.302 (1.274) 
Bidder MTBV 0.001 (0.140) 
 
-0.001 (-0.827) 
 
0.002 (0.906) 
 
0.001 (0.494) 
 
0.003 (1.054) 
Bidder lnMV 0.039** (2.305) 
 
0.053*** (6.055) 
 
0.049*** (5.451) 
 
0.036*** (3.614) 
 
0.058*** (3.541) 
Bidder Volatility -3.192 (-0.916) 
 
0.357 (0.332) 
 
1.194 (0.882) 
 
0.659 (0.392) 
 
1.040 (0.428) 
Bidder RunUps 0.087 (1.148)  0.033 (1.301)  -0.020 (-0.594)  -0.014 (-0.356)  -0.006 (-0.106) 
Target ROA 0.074 (0.498) 
 
0.161*** (2.597) 
 
0.120* (1.933) 
 
0.152** (2.180) 
 
0.006 (0.057) 
Target MTBV -0.002 (-0.239) 
 
-0.002 (-0.909) 
 
-0.003* (-1.740) 
 
0.000 (0.166) 
 
-0.006** (-2.376) 
Target lnMV -0.035* (-1.946) 
 
-0.081*** (-8.147) 
 
-0.074*** (-7.081) 
 
-0.067*** (-5.134) 
 
-0.076*** (-4.398) 
Target Volatility 1.990 (0.941) 
 
-1.329 (-1.558) 
 
-0.283 (-0.268) 
 
-0.356 (-0.245) 
 
-0.522 (-0.366) 
Target RunUps 0.037 (0.514)  0.060** (2.380)  0.024 (0.905)  0.011 (0.336)  0.025 (0.608) 
Constant -0.498*** (-3.279) 
 
0.234** (2.478) 
 
0.301*** (3.095) 
 
0.288** (2.416) 
 
0.119 (0.747) 
Year  Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes           
Industry Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes           
N 137 
  
911 
  
830           
 
496 
  
334           
adj. R
2
 0.243     0.195     0.184             0.131     0.305   
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Appendix C. Testing the role of the target reference point price as overpayment  
Robustness checks. 
This table presents both OLS and 2SLS regression results of bidder market model 3-day announcement returns on the 
offer premium. Following Baker et al.’s approach (2012), we used the target 52-week high price as an instrumental 
variable. Hausman test and first-stage F test are reported below the table. Variable definitions are as in the notes to 
Table 2. Robustness t-statistics were reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% 
level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
  (1) (2)    
 
Bidder CAR3 
  OLS IV 
Offer Premiums -0.020*** -0.140*** 
 
(-2.805) (-3.430) 
Hostile -0.000 0.003 
 
(-0.039) (0.436) 
Tender 0.008** 0.020*** 
 
(2.102) (3.211) 
Diversification 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.350) (-0.283) 
Stock -0.010** -0.009* 
 
(-2.094) (-1.768) 
Cash 0.019*** 0.015*** 
 
(4.657) (3.121) 
Relative Size 0.001 0.016** 
 
(0.206) (2.365) 
Bidder lnMV 0.000 0.007** 
 
(0.058) (2.545) 
Bidder ROA 0.033* 0.034** 
 
(1.846) (2.434) 
Bidder MTBV -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.309) (-0.567) 
Bidder RunUps -0.002 0.006 
 
(-0.311) (1.235) 
Target lnMV -0.004*** -0.014*** 
 
(-3.096) (-3.866) 
Constant 0.013 0.039*** 
 
(1.645) (3.109) 
N 1878 1878 
adj. R
2
 0.053 . 
Hausman test  10.7173 (p = 0.0011)  
F-test 53.5326 (p = 0.0000)  
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Appendix D. The effect of RRP on the probability of using stocks  
Robustness checks. 
Panel A of the table reports binomial logistic regression for 100% stock-financed acquisitions on the RRP by different 
RRP groups. Specifically, RRP>0 represents bidders that are relatively more overvalued than their targets, and RRP<0 
represents bidders that are relatively more undervalued than their targets. There are 50 observations missing due to 
multicollinearity problem of the year and industry dummies, so that we are left with 1,742 observations, 1,103 for 
RRP>0 group, and 639 for RRP<0 group. Panel B reports multinomial logistic regression results for Stock versus Cash 
and Stock versus Mixed. “Stock” refers to acquisitions that are 100% financed by stocks. “Cash” refers to acquisitions 
that are 100% financed with cash. “Mixed” refers to acquisitions that are neither 100% cash financed nor 100% stocks 
financed. There are 5 missing observations that are defined as “Other” in terms of the method of payment in Thomson 
One. Panel C reports OLS regression of stock as percentage of the method of payment on the RRP. Our control 
variables were as shown in the specification (4) of Table 3. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 2. 
Robustness t-statistics were reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels was denoted 
***, **, and * respectively. 
Panel A: Binomial logistic regressions. By the RRP       
 
RRP>0 
 
RRP<0 
RRP 0.831*** 
 
-0.232 
t-stat. (3.005) 
 
(-0.508) 
Variables Controlled 
 
Controlled 
Year &Industry Yes 
 
Yes 
N 1103 
 
639 
Pseudo R
2
 0.316  0.350 
Panel B: Multinomial logistic regressions. By the method of payment       
 
Stock Vs Cash 
 
Stock Vs Mix 
RRP 0.728*** 
 
0.425** 
t-stat. (3.590) 
 
(2.380) 
Variables Controlled 
 
Controlled 
Year & Industry Yes 
 
Yes 
N 1787 
 
1787 
Pseudo R
2
 0.288 
 
0.288 
Panel C: OLS regressions. Stocks as a percentage of the method of payment      
 
Stocks (%) 
  RRP 4.170*** 
  t-stat. (2.600) 
  Variables Controlled 
  Year &Industry Yes 
  N 975 
  adj. R
2
 0.283   
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Appendix E. The effect of the RRP on the offer premium  
Robustness checks. 
This table reports the OLS results for offer premiums on the RRP by different subsamples. Panel A divides the sample by the method of payment, as reported in specifications (1) 
and (2), by whether a deal is diversified or not, as reported in specifications (3) and (4), by whether a deal is a tender offer or not, as reported in specifications (5) and (6), and by 
whether a deal is successfully or not within the sample period, as reported in specifications (7) and (8). Panel B reports the RRP effect on offer premiums by the median value of 
target information asymmetry (IA), where target IA was calculated with the standard deviation of daily returns over the 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement 
date. Specification (1) reports the results for the higher target information asymmetry subsample, and specification (2) reports the results for the lower target information asymmetry 
subsample. Our regressions in both Panels control all variables as in specification (5) of Table 5. All year and industry effects were included in the regressions. Robustness 
t-statistics were reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels was denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
Panel A: the RRP effect on offer premiums by deal information 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
 
Method of Payment   Diversification   Tender   Successful 
 
Stock Cash 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
RRP 0.072** 0.170*** 
 
0.124*** 0.098** 
 
0.196*** 0.093*** 
 
0.107*** 0.129** 
t-stat. (2.012) (4.195) 
 
(3.357) (3.244) 
 
(4.518) (3.526) 
 
(4.335) (2.269) 
Variables Controlled Controlled 
 
Controlled Controlled 
 
Controlled Controlled 
 
Controlled Controlled 
Year & Industry Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 608 726 
 
702 1176 
 
380 1498 
 
1597 277 
adj. R
2
 0.159 0.234   0.167 0.176   0.235 0.151   0.170 0.232 
Panel B: the RRP effect on offer premiums by target information asymmetry (IA) 
 
(1) (2) 
         
 
High target IA Low target IA 
         RRP 0.140*** 0.039 
         t-stat. (4.996) (1.464) 
         Variables Controlled Controlled 
         Year & Industry Yes Yes 
         N 939 939 
         adj. R
2
 0.148 0.189                   
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Figure 1: Nonlinear relationship between offer premiums and the target reference point (TRP) 
This figure presents the nonlinear relationship between offer premiums and the target reference point (TRP). Offer 
Premiums is the logarithmic term difference between the offer price and the target stock price 30 days prior to the 
takeover announcement. TRP is the logarithmic term difference between the target highest stock price over the 335 
calendars ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and the target stock price on 30 day prior to the announcement 
date. We used local polynomial regression to smooth scatter plots, and set our sample where both offer premiums and 
TRP are larger than 0, and less than 100%. For the reason that M&As are driven by the relatively more overvalued 
bidders, we therefore limited our sample to the group of large RRP (or RRP>0). 
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